



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

observation, as M. Cheysson has remarked, one is sure to seize upon all the symptoms of misfortune or of happiness, of antagonism or of peace, which should serve as criteria for further researches.

I. W. HOWERTH.

Misère de la Philosophie. Par KARL MARX. Avec une préface de FRIEDRICH ENGELS. Paris: V. Giard et E. Brière, 1896. 18mo. pp. 291.

Socialisme et Science Positive. Par ENRICO FERRI. Paris: V. Giard et E. Brière, 1897. 8vo. pp. 220.

THIS reprint of Marx's earliest exposition of his peculiar economic views is notable, not in point of novelty, nor because it adds to what is already currently known by students of Marx with regard to his early position, but because it is evidence of the unabated authority with which the writings of the master still appeal to the thoughtful and studious adherents of the school. It may be noted in this connection that a German translation of the book (by men as eminent in the socialist world as Bernstein and Kautsky) has also recently (1892) appeared. The present reprint is an unaltered reproduction of the book as it originally appeared in 1847, in Marx's polemical onslaught on Proudhon, except for the incorporation of certain minor corrections made by the author in the margins of his private copy of the volume. There are also added, by way of appendices, three briefer papers by Marx,—a condemnatory letter on Proudhon, reprinted from the *Sozialdemokrat* (Berlin) of 1865; an extract from *Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie*, going to disprove Proudhon's claim to originality in his proposed *banque du peuple*; and the address on free trade before the Democratic Association of Brussels. These supplementary documents go to enforce the impression made by Engels's preface, that the purpose of the reprint is in some measure a polemical one. The preface is directed to the disproof of any possible indebtedness of Marx to Rodbertus, as well as to the definitive confutation of all who may claim any originality or other merit for Rodbertus, whether as against Marx or otherwise in connection with economic discussion. Although Engels's preface dates from 1884, it may not be out of place to repeat, for the good of Rodbertus's admirers and champions at this day, certain characteristic claims and assertions here made by Marx's lifelong intimate friend, "the most

truthful of the socialists." After referring for details to his prospective discussion of the relation between Marx and Rodbertus in the subsequently published preface to the fourth edition of Marx's *Kapital*, he goes on to say :

It will be sufficient here to say that when Rodbertus accuses Marx of having "despoiled " him and "of having in his *Kapital* drawn extensively on, but without citing," his work, *Zur Erkenntniss*, etc., he has allowed himself to be led into a calumny which can be explained only through the ill humor naturally to be expected of an unappreciated genius, and through his remarkable ignorance of things which took place outside of Prussia, and more especially his ignorance of economic and socialistic literature. Neither these complaints nor Rodbertus's work above cited had ever come under Marx's eyes; he had no acquaintance with Rodbertus beyond the three *Sozialen Briefe*, and even these assuredly not prior to 1858 or 1859.

PROFESSOR FERRI's work, which has now come to hand in a French edition, is no less laudatory of Marx. The juxtaposition of names in the sententious subtitle (" Darwin, Spencer, Marx ") is of itself a sufficient promise of an appreciatory discussion of Marx's writings and of his place in the science. The eminent Italian criminalologist gives in his adhesion to the tenets of scientific socialism without equivocation, and sets out with a promise to justify the claims of that dogma to be the complement, on the side of the social sciences, of that theory of development for which, in its general features, Darwin's name serves as catchword in the biological sciences.

Part I (pp. 13-85) of the volume is in great measure taken up with a refutation of what Professor Ferri regards as the three fundamental objections that have been made against socialism on grounds of evolutionary theory. These three points of alleged contradiction between Darwinism and socialism are: (*a*) Socialism demands equality of individuals, while the evolutionary process constantly accentuates that inequality between individuals which alone affords play for the selective adaptation of the species or the type; (*b*) socialism demands the survival, in comfort and fullness of life, of all individuals, whereas Darwinism (taking the term here, as elsewhere in the book, in the broad sense in which it is popularly used) requires the destruction, through the struggle for existence, of the great majority of individuals; (*c*) the struggle for existence secures a progressive elimination of the unfit and a survival of the superior individuals, resulting in a progressive amelioration of the selected minority of individuals that are

in this way delegated to carry on the development of the species or of the type, whereas socialism, by giving all an even chance of life, reduces the aggregate of individuals to a dead level of democratic uniformity, in which the superior merits of the "fit" count for nothing.

Of these objections to socialism Haeckel is regarded as the best and most effective spokesman that has yet appeared; other and later restatements, of which the number is by no means small, being taken only as feebler variants of the apology for natural selection made by the great German apostle of Darwinism. The alleged contradictions are reviewed somewhat in detail, and the socialist position which claims a full accord between the teachings of evolutionary science and the prospectus of revolutionary evolution offered by spokesmen of Marxism are summarized and restated in a telling manner, though with somewhat more of a declamatory turn than would be required for the purpose of an enumeration of the data bearing on the question of human evolution and a formulation of the inferences to be drawn from these data. The three contradictions which are passed under review are disposed of by showing, in rather more convincing form than is usual with the scientific apologists of socialism, (*a*) that the equality of individuals demanded by the socialist scheme is an equality of opportunities rather than an identity of function or of the details of life; (*b*) that the struggle for existence, as applied within the field of social evolution, is a struggle between groups and institutions rather than a competition *à outrance* between the individuals of the group, and that this struggle can lead to socially desirable results only as it is carried on on the basis of a large measure of group solidarity and co-operation between the individuals of the group; that the "normal" *milieu* for the competitive development of individuals in society in the direction of availability for the social purpose and a fuller and more truly human life is afforded only by an environment which secures the members of the community a competent and equitable—if not equal—immunity from the sordid cares of a life of pecuniary competition. Only under such an environment can we look for the development and fixation of a type of man which shall best meet the requirements of associated human life. That is to say, the closer an approach is made to a condition of pecuniary equality and solidarity the better are the chances of a survival of the "fittest," in the sense of the most efficient for the purposes of the collective life. And this brings us to the considera-

tion of the third alleged contradiction between the socialist scheme and Darwinism—that an abolition of the pecuniary struggle would abolish the evolutionary factor of a selective survival of the fittest individuals. It is (*c*) only by injecting a wholly illegitimate teleological meaning into the term “fittest,” as used by Darwin and the Darwinists that the expression “survival of the fittest” is made to mean a survival of the socially desirable individuals. This whole objection, therefore, is a sophism which proceeds on a teleological preconception—a survival in modern discussion of a concept which belongs among the mental furniture of the metaphysical speculations of the pre-Darwinian times. A sober review of well-known facts, we are told, shows that the present competitive system does not by any means uniformly result in a working out of favorable results by a process of natural selection. “It is well known that in the modern civilized world the action of natural selection is vitiated by the presence of a military selection, by matrimonial selection, and especially by economic selection” (p. 49). Professor Ferri here develops very briefly, and turns to socialist account, the theory of “social selection” of types originated by Broca, and more recently developed with greater fullness and effect by Lapouge, Ammon, and Loria. It is only in the “*milieu normal*” afforded by such an equality of pecuniary competence as the socialist scheme contemplates that the factor of “choice” has a chance to act and to award the victory to “the most normal individuals” and types.

The struggle for existence, and therefore the fact of a selective adaptation, is a fact inseparable from the life process, and therefore inseparable from the life of mankind; but while its scope remains unaltered, the forms under which it expresses itself in the life of society change as the development of collective life proceeds. The most striking general modification which the struggle has suffered in the past growth of society, and the feature which most immediately concerns the present discussions, is seen in the transformation of this struggle for existence in the communities of the occidental culture into a struggle for equality.

During the historical period of development, Græco-Latin society in the first place carried on a struggle for *civil* equality (abolition of slavery); this struggle was triumphant, but it did not stop there, for life and struggle are the same facts stated in different words; society during the Middle Ages carried on its struggle for *religious* equality, achieved it, but did not stop there; and at the close of the last century the struggle was for *political* equality. Is

society now to come to a standstill and to stagnate in its present phase? Today the struggle of society is for *economic* equality; not for an absolute pecuniary equality, but for an equality of that more consequential kind of which I have spoken above. And everything goes to impress upon us with mathematical certainty that when this victory is achieved it must in turn give place to further struggles and new ideals among the generations that are to succeed us (pp. 37-38).

This struggle for equality, as is to some extent true of any other expression of the struggle within a given society, takes the form of a struggle between classes, and necessarily so. It is therefore a struggle for existence on the basis of solidarity and co-operation. The discovery of this law of cultural evolution, "of this grand conception," "is the imperishable glory of Marx, which secures him a place in sociology such as that occupied by Darwin in biology, and by Spencer in natural philosophy" (p. 71).

According to Professor Ferri socialism is atheistic, as a matter of course; but he regards the antagonism of the religious organizations, as well as the quasi-socialistic endeavors of the Roman Catholic church, with the utmost complacency; being fully persuaded that in this matter of irreligiousness as a requisite of socialistic reform the course of events will effectually take care of itself. No thought need be taken for the education of humanity away from the theistic cults, since the cults, with their entire theistic content, will disappear from man's habits of thought as fast as the chief positions of evolutionary science are accepted. This is the meaning to be attached to the declaration of the Erfurt programme that religion is a private affair with which the socialist propaganda will not concern itself. Education—a familiarity with the views and the point of view of modern science—will obliterate the faiths; therefore the socialist propaganda need take no thought for erasing them (pp. 56-63).

Similarly, although the scheme of socialism is, fundamentally and of necessity, republican—being but a reorganization of the industrial community on republican lines—the office of republicanizing society, as a step preparatory to its socialization, may without misgiving be left to bourgeois liberalism, which must necessarily work out such a result as its logical outcome.

Incidentally, in so far as it is not altogether relevant to the main point of the book, but somewhat at large, in so much as the discussion runs through some twenty-five pages, the great Italian criminalologist

has a word of kindly admonition to say to the students of Sociology and Political Economy. This discussion (Part III of the volume) is headed: "Sociology and Socialism," and the two chapters of which it is made up bear the captions: The Sterility of Sociology, and Marx the Complement of Darwin and Spencer.

One of the most curious facts in the history of scientific thought during the nineteenth century is this, that while the profound revolution in science wrought by Darwinism and the Spencerian evolutionism has rehabilitated every department of physical, biological, and even the psychological sciences, and endowed them with a new youth, this same scientific revolution has, upon reaching the domain of the social sciences, barely rippled the surface of the still waters of that pool of orthodoxy in social science, Political Economy.

It is true, there was a move made by Auguste Comte . . . toward the creation of a new science, Sociology, which was intended, in conjunction with the natural history of human society, to form the glorious consummation of a new edifice of science erected by the empirical method (p. 145).

It is admitted that some substantial work has been done in the descriptive or "anatomical" branches of the science that deals with the social organism, but after all has been said it is to be admitted that in all this, with the exception of the author's own special department of Criminal Sociology, the results hitherto achieved have been meager in the extreme.

So soon as the discussion comes in contact with the live political and social questions, the new science of Sociology is overtaken by some sort of hypnotic slumber, and remains in a state of indecision in the limbo of sterile and colorless generalities, such as will permit the sociologues to continue, in questions of the public economy as well as in politics, as conservatives or as radicals just as their caprice or inclination may dictate (p. 146).

The secret of this curious phenomenon lies not alone in the fact pointed out by Malagodi that the science is still in the period of scientific analysis and has not yet reached the period of synthesis, but more especially in this, that the logical consequences of Darwinism and of scientific evolutionism, when applied to the study of human society, lead inexorably to socialism (p. 147).

As a remedy for this desperate state of the science, Professor Ferri recommends sociological and economic students to seek somewhere the courage necessary to accept the logical consequences of their own argument. And for scientific method they are frankly commended to

turn to Karl Marx as the only competent guide. The Marxian Materialistic Theory of History, and the Theory of Class Struggle, together with the Theory of Surplus Labor, point the way which Sociology and Political Economy must follow if they are to take a place as modern sciences of the post-Darwinian epoch. T. B. VEBLEN.

The Labor Question in Britain. By PAUL DE ROUSIERS, with a preface by HENRI DE TOURVILLE. Translated by F. L. D. HERBERTSON. London: Macmillan & Co., 1896. 8vo. pp. xxvi + 393.

A WORK in descriptive economics which is not merely an amorphous aggregation of facts, but in which facts are made to set forth an important economic idea—such a work is almost a rarity, and deserves to be treated with respect. M. de Rousier's description of the English industrial system is designed throughout to show the dominant tendency in modern industrial evolution and to teach the lesson that prosperity for the laborer lies in adjusting his conduct to the great industrial changes of the age, not in trying to resist them. The small workshop and hand labor are being replaced by machine production in vast establishments. The laborer whose work may be at any moment taken from him by a revolution of this sort need not be ruined by it if he can quickly find a place in the new system, if, that is, he has avoided a specialization so narrow that he is unfit for any but his accustomed work. His education should develop his power of initiative, making him a resourceful man, rather than a skillful craftsman. The industries of England have been chosen to illustrate this idea on the ground that the development of industry is there most advanced and that Englishmen have shown an unparalleled facility in adapting themselves to changes. This fortunate characteristic is thought to result from the superiority of English education. Men in England, more than elsewhere, it is said, are expected to rely upon themselves, and "the same difference may be observed in the education of children. French parents . . . find it hard to treat their children as men, would fain keep them children. . . . In England the chief aim is to accustom children to life as they will find it later. . . . Workmen are treated in the same way. The object is not to make good workmen, *who will remain workmen*, but